



## Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen

**Edward Campbell**

### **Music after Deleuze**

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The *Music after Deleuze* belongs to the research series “Deleuze Encounters” of the international Bloomsbury Publishing, devoted to studying theoretical-practical shifts in understanding selected phenomena in regard to Deleuze’s insights. Aside from this title, Bloomsbury also published *Philosophy after Deleuze*, *Theology after Deleuze*, *Political Theory after Deleuze*, *Cinema after Deleuze* and *Space after Deleuze*, with the intentions to continue the well-accepted series. With this book in particular, a general positive reception is justified as Campbell finds a near-perfect blend of introductory, educational presentation of key ideas and proofs whilst exploring philosophical aspects of music, an often marginalized theme. In this sense, from one perspective it is important to understand that this is not a gravitational point of research on Deleuze’s fundamental ideas, and most scholars familiar with Deleuze may not find much of “interest” other than perhaps expanding their Deleuzeian view in regard to music, while in the perspective that remained, the text will enrich any newcomer to Deleuze and will entirely satisfy a wide range of scholars interested in the nature of music. There are three reasons for this: firstly, Campbell’s style of writing excels in clearness and will appeal to most readers greatly, secondly, next to cinema, *music* is perhaps the best “practical” medium to understand and apply many of Deleuzeian concepts, and thirdly, it is so because music as such contains a marvelously reflected microcosm of the *philosophical* which in turn relates to the thought mechanisms. This is further supported by Deleuze himself, who “was not at all a musician and certainly not a music theorist” (p. 1), positing music in his work *What is Philosophy?* as exemplary fun-

dament to all *observed* phenomena. On the backside, it is important to notice that many examples will require some minimal understanding of theory of music and composition. But quickly a fourth reason might emerge to counter it once we realize that the peculiar strive of the 20th century music was to differentiate itself from within, through itself, against the political era of (destructive) seminal nationalism. Juxtaposed with poetry, they both behaved in a similar fashion, as Gianni Vattimo observed, and so this is another fragment of important perspectives that dig into the “nothing, and yet” of the 20th century.

With music playing a significant role in entire Deleuze’s opus, Campbell is free to rely on an established connection folding philosophy and music, collecting all major relations between phenomenological and musical, in fact finding each other in *thought* as such (or more correctly: in condition defining a way of thinking). As Campbell will immediately notice, Deleuze’s core term *différence* is directly linked to the ability of philosophy to open one’s perspective anew, to differentiate from others, and to, in fact, think differently. Thus, as a result, a different thinking, a relevant thinking, along the line of Jean-Luc Nancy’s *singulier pluriel*, continually produces new worlds, new relations, and new differences. Campbell works his way through these relays by attempting to show how Deleuzeian philosophemes can serve in rethinking music (aiding composers, performers, theoreticians, or historians equally), because, from the underlying importance in an ocean of the 20th century’s terror, the hunt for identity surfaced at the beginning of a new millennium. It is reflected in the overall musical progression during the 20th century, which brought an explosion of musical creativity – the difference – which earlier on Deleuze registered as a phenomenon more relevant than identity. It is therefore only natural for Campbell to dedicate the first of five chapters to *difference*, *repetition*, and *variation*. Campbell mainly uses references to contemporary “high art” experimental composers (such as Pierre Boulez and György Kurtág), affirms jazz to

some point, and some of the traditional forms such as the ancient Japanese gagaku of the Kyoto imperial era, whose positions on the philosophy of music touch Deleuzeian concepts, using only pre-Deleuze classical composers to show points of departure, because it was Deleuze himself who used these authors to explain his insights. Campbell will therefore heavily rely on premises such as A. B. Marx's statement regarding musical worth in terms of differentiating form, thematicism and tonal construction (p. 6), and it seems to be something that Deleuze would approve. This approach is up to debate since it ignores a rich contemporary world of non-classical music, but on the wider look it does not really affect any arguments or concepts Campbell is investigating, so I advise a reader to simply "pass over" this issue and perhaps consider expanding the presented material on their own behalf by comparing other *musical worlds* and their appropriate meaning.

Deleuze has started working around the historically established frame of thinking regarding the difference and identity as understood since Plato up until Hegel and further on, but in fact building his argument on Nietzsche's and Bergson's critical insights into categorical thinking and thus reverting the theory away from the canon. From Bergson he adopted the theory of internal difference which "gives" any one thing its internal change in time, and therefore space, concluding in formation of subjectivity for any living being with awareness (Edgar Morin will, for example, systematically consider this "value of internal value creation" in his major work *La Méthode*, whilst in the wider angle this formulates the basics of Deleuze-Guattari biophilosophy ultimately concentrated in *rhizome*). From Nietzsche, who, in this line of argument, heavily criticized Kant for excluding (subjective) value creation while considering the moral apparatus of a person, Deleuze adopted the underlying logic of the Nietzschean *return of the same* – not as ever-the-same, but as ever-different-the-same, inexhaustible, yet unifyingly the same. In overall, it was an attempt to transfer *the difference* in philosophical investigations from different concepts into concept of *difference*, and in its wake Deleuze tried to disband the limiting notion of categorical thinking sprouting since Plato's *Ideas*. Campbell outlined it clearly: "In Deleuzeian sense, difference is not difference from or within something. (...) at the end of this thought process, we are left with a range of likeness and resemblances which can be classified in terms of their degree of identity and difference from the initial idea" (p. 8).

The goal was, much like for many other philosophers of the 20th century, to destroy the false idea/vision of clear, bordered, exact distinctions in the world, the idea that somehow elements develop by specific prediction model and fall under single algorithm; in other words, the goal was to unbound *acategorical thought*. This is precisely why Campbell will compare Deleuze's work mostly to experimentalists, for the most part for their ability to destroy compartmenting, which is a valid approach because they systematically include variation as the key characteristic. Thus, for example the 12-tone system as one such probable example, Beethoven's notion of "underlying idea" may belong here among other, but Boulez's use of heterophony is perhaps most important since it directly strikes Deleuze's intentions. For Boulez, heterophony is a "way of affirming the identity of the group while acknowledging variants, even individual deviances" (p. 21). Along these lines Deleuze introduced us to the philosopheme *fold*, drawing from Leibniz's impossibility (possibility of simultaneous co-existence of the contradictory notions, or lack of thereof in respect to the tradition). Deleuze and Boulez agreed that, for many modern philosophers and artists, "divergences, impossibilities, discords and dissonances coexist in the same world" (p. 22), and the music is projected accordingly. In this sense, what in general may seem to be presupposed as a *repetition* is in fact a *variation*. In experimentalism it is mostly expressed in a radical manner, aiming to breach the created limits of applied theoretics, which then emphasizes before-mentioned value of internal difference, but it also appears that further musical investigations often yield a *necessity* of sort, a submerged need to equilibrate between the variety and repetition, the fixed and the fluid. An act of *improvisation* interestingly falls between the two phenomena, and it may also spur a discussion regarding an intrinsic characteristic of signed freedom it contains, that is, in comparison to the cultural interpretations of one's freedom of expression outside and within the art world.

As foreshadowed in the previous paragraphs, Deleuze's early work *Difference and Repetition* got (over)developed in alliance with Felix Guattari and culminated in the *assemblage*, which is why Campbell naturally chose this referencing concept for his second chapter. Here is another good Campbell's observation that the philosophy Deleuze and Guattari were producing eventually became their self, the "molecular image of thought" got embodied, and texts began to lack structure, to a certain degree turning into a detailed

deluge of ideas summarized in the *concept of rhizome*, defying the image of thought as arborescent, concept of *plane of immanence*, defying the fixed, lifeless structural interlocking of concepts, and the concept of *Body without Organs*, defying an idea of fully organized and integrated object, rather, all three are describing the factual *perpetual becoming* (pp. 35–36, 38–39, 40–41).

The key moment is Boulez's concept of *diagonal*, here adapted into continuation logic of distinctive innovative artist's contributions to the problems left by the precedents, which may provoke criticism from some of us. The erudite multilogue provided by Campbell in his excavation of Deleuzeian-Guattarian thick conceptual meshes related to practical applications in music theory and composition come only so far, as it seems to compress the music art down into a series (again, similar to Jean-Luc Nancy and his analysis of productive plurality of worlds and knowledge) of technical solutions for technical issues. While many professional musicologists will agree on this approach for most of the discourses regarding objective components of any musical piece, these discussions and investigations often completely neglect the sheer *life* of artist's performance, who is indeed a Diltheyan subject, whether it be in creation, or presentation, that is, re-evocation of his "work". In the work many of these concepts turn visible only through direct act of creation/production and nothing else – specifically *not* through careful planning or problem solving – and precisely these draw most attention among the listeners. In short, in this sense *Music after Deleuze* is yet another study which nullifies the important *praxis-poiesis* relation in the context of *ingenium*, and allows *techne* to appear sovereign. While reading it is advised to see these rows of Campbell's examples as an attempt to understand what the *philosophical* in the music can offer through selected artists and Deleuze himself, how close to the face of the unknown, to "silence", can they come in logical derivation, in exact and goal-oriented literal rethinking, rather than spending your time considering how the scope of given discourse lacks because it is avoiding the core rhizomatic component – the spontaneous advancement.

Nevertheless, rhizome is a phenomenal contribution to the understanding how ideas develop and evolve, but also how thought as thought and meaning as meaning – both as certain entities differencing from their carriers – further evolve, spread, and organize via communication and creation, in regard to Campbell and Deleuze's observation specifically as "chromaticism in continuous

variation through which music becomes a superlinear system" (pp. 37–38). They prescribe this rhizomatic behaviour to planes of immanence accordingly, but still retain the aforementioned equilibrium, necessary strata required to maintain form and function, all in all, a minimal identity value. For Deleuze and Guattari, historical developments in musical expressions have depended upon such deterritorialisations (concepts breaking down and are uprooted from their context only to reassemble with other heterogeneous elements to form new assemblages, including on a different plane altogether), that is, ideal outbreaks from the painted, finished horizon which create "a new diagonal" along the "harmonic vertical and melodic horizontal" coordinates (p. 40) to form a new assemblage composed of various milieus. Musical sound is only one component among others within a musical assemblage, since it is formed equally from literary, artistic, philosophical and many other milieus, the elements of which are assembled to form an expressive musical territory or refrain (p. 42), and on a lower scale, a particular song is derived from more than just a sound.

In the context of music compositions, Campbell will demonstrate limits of assemblage with a series of examples working marvelously in their role of applied Deleuzeian concepts, but we can also say that the entire third chapter titled "Rethinking Musical Pitch: The Smooth and the Striated" and the fourth chapter "Thinking Musical Time" are complex examples of the ideas laid and explained in the first two chapters, only specified with *continuity* and *discontinuity*. It is an important ideal pair that Deleuze inherited from Bergson, here in regard to the dimensions of space and time, that is: spatiality as it appears in pitch alteration (smooth, undivided, continuous) and temporality as it appears in musical content distribution (pp. 67–68). It is worth understanding that at this point the book strides away from the philosophical investigations and appears closer to historical accounting of various events that pushed certain compositional ideas without real effect on the philosophical advancement. Nevertheless, the fascination with two fundamentals can be drawn from their cosmological pair, that is, the unifying time-space mode at the same moment provides absolute coordinate system for everything there is in existent universe, just as it does for one tiny compositional piece, a universe of its own, while, because of its own nature, the elementary pair enables near-absolute freedom of articulation of its own matter by not being directly manipulated. Wondrously, the veil upon which we formulate space-time relations, specifically in a musical piece,

can never cover the source of its relations: no matter what kind of division we employ in our space-time harmony, pitches are always separated by a spatial interval even when we can't really hear it (p. 96). Similarly, manipulation of rhythm, tempo, and duration in characterizing pulsing and unpulsing modes of alteration still cannot achieve a true continuum, cannot fully blend, there is always a grounding rule that prevents absolutisation, "time in music can only be treated nominalistically with due respect for the variability and specificity of the multiple times and temporalities embodied within contemporary musical works, which all adds up to a cartography of variables" (p. 101), and even though both in case of spatiality and in case of temporality an illusion of purest form is created, it is only an illusion: as if both space and time "wish" to demonstrate that they cannot be enslaved.

However, there is much more to this time–music relation for Deleuze and Guattari to simply leave it at ease, as it appears to them that it, specifically temporality, "mimics" thought processes, so in this regard I will selectively turn to some of the well-argued points of interest in the last third of the book. With their distinctions of pulse it seems to describe the perpetual movement which is at work in their new image of thought (as flows and forces). The time distinction relates to the aforementioned planes, most specifically plane of consistency which is based on the plane of immanence (or sometimes means exactly that), but as such is ultimately based on the molecular-ity concept, on "only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (...) at least between elements that are relatively uniformed, molecules and particles of all kind (p. 103). Stockhausen's work is later used to bring this idea up, "simultaneous accelerations and blockages" under a "clock keeping a whole assortment of times", entirely being an exemplification of how *thoughts* work (p. 120). Deleuze and Guattari firstly, pre-phenomenally explain this through comparing Chronos (composed only of interlocking presents) and Aion (decomposed into elongated pasts and futures). "If Aion divides past and future into relation to an infinitesimal instant, Chronos, in contrast, is an 'eternal present', something like God's view of time in which past, present and future are held together as one" (p. 104). The important thing in this distinction is that they are not in conflict, but rather, work simultaneously (much like many natural phenomena work on two levels, for example the climate). This is how they formulate it: "There is always a vaster present which absorbs the past and the future. Thus, the relativity of past and future with respect to the present entails

a relativity of presents themselves, in relation to each other. God experiences as present that which for me is future or past, since I live inside more limited presents. Chronos is an encasement, a coiling up of relative presents" (p. 104). This is why Deleuze and Guattari are attracted to Boulez who appears to be working out mechanism for making time audible in music, rather than music audible in time. Ultimately, as we will further see, it is a quest for dominance.

Prior to Chronos and Aion, Deleuze also developed an idea of three distinct times, recognized as "passive syntheses", the first of which is the "living present", in which the past and future are dimensions that are contracted into the present, the second of which is the past revealed not as something fixed but as a constantly fluid, continuously reordered synthesis of all former presents, and the third which is marked by cuts and caesurae in which each new present/event organizes all of the other anew. It is a static present that is "determinable yet undetermined". At first it may seem in conflict, but Campbell follows J. Williams in folding the two approaches: "While Chronos closely resembles the first passive synthesis, the third relates strongly to Aion, leaving the second as a situation in which 'the relation between Aion and Chronos' is 'mediate through intensity'" (p. 106). Fluidity of time as seen by Deleuze is accompanied by Bergson's concept of time as indivisible, continuous experimental flux, and even though Bergson's argument has been heavily criticized during his time, I agree, along with Campbell, Deleuze, and Guattari, that Bergson's attempt to explain that musical melody, in fact, through memory which must somehow grasp all of its notes as a unity-in-instant, points to interconnecting mechanism of successive states of consciousness. And it is rightly noticed that Deleuze and Bergson share a common ground with Whitehead's processual philosophy in number of ways, but all in all as a "influx to the other into that self-identity". What we take from Deleuze's philosophy of time, states Campbell, is the multiplicity of temporal possibilities. Campbell will proceed to use examples of Wagner, Brahms, Messiaen, Debussy and others, in order to show how composers strive to achieve (and show us) control over temporality by producing alternatives, mainly in rhythm and metric, to the point of elimination. Stockhausen has again proven exemplary. "With the concept of the 'moment' and 'Moment-form', Stockhausen formulates a type of musical structure in which each 'moment' has its own distinguished features and is perceived as a distinct 'implicit eternity' and not as a stage in developmental

process" (p. 121). What they are aiming at is basically the nature of haiku, or more correctly, how haiku manifests its nature in the reader/listener. Barthes noticed this phenomena, he attempts to show us the striking moments of unusual haiku sub-structures, that is, the way it jumps at us, rather than luring, the manner in which stops us, drowning us into stasis, rather than provoking us by enslaving the language. But precisely in this "Moment-form" we find openness to poetic-theoretic depth in refusing to exclaim mastery. Haiku in fact shows ever-opening thisness of something, much like Stockhausen's Moment-form as well as Deleuze and Guattari's haecceity concept. They find a great example in Lorca: "five in the evening when love falls and fascism rises."

As we can easily see, it is entirely aligned to the "dispersive" perspectives of French philosophy, and at the same time elegantly paints the elusive image of contemporary man/world. This is because their philosophy brings this phenomenological elusivity before our eyes. In a certain sense it is perhaps the finest articulation of inner mental working to date, and the appropriate thinking about it, the one Husserl, Bergson, and Whitehead would certainly be proud of. However, Campbell's research did not end here. In the final chapter of *Music after Deleuze*, Campbell visits Deleuze's semiotic investigations in regard to music. Campbell claims that there is no need for clear understanding of the field of semiotics or semiology (in other words: if you are not familiar with de Saussure, Hjelmslev, and Pierce, it does not matter), but I would greatly disagree. To truly understand the interlocked depth between semiotics and Deleuze's post-structural philosophical (And why one would not want to? What would be the point in that?), the text requires some elementary knowledge in the way the three authors understand human interaction. Nevertheless, a less competent reader can still "collect" details on Deleuzean molecularity linked mostly to Hjelmslev's work because his concepts bypass the traditional opposition of form and content and recognizes the arbitrary nature of simple designations of elements as either expression or content. It concentrates on stages prior to the formation and constitution of elements (as expressions or content). This is the core of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of Body without Organs, that is, "the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified body on which all fixed categories and structures are dissolved or decomposed only to form ever-new formations of heterogeneous elements" (p. 144). Deleuze and Guattari reform the notion of meaning as following: "an

interface between at least two force fields, or more specifically, between a form of content and a form of expression" (p. 145). Campbell points out Massumi's example for understanding this, namely carpenter's workshop and the process of making a table. In short, the carpenter's methods and procedures are the form of expression, and while the series of states undergone by the wood in the process from that of raw material to a table is the form of content. In outmost beauty of symmetric simplicity, these understandings can be compared to phenomenological observations made by Heidegger in articulating the origin (therefore: meaning) of art. The "web" of connections between expression and content (as if to model Heidegger's conclusions) is what Deleuze and Guattari term 'diagram', which is basically a sort of schemata of interaction, that is, of translational processes. These relations exist between objects themselves and in ideas.

How does this relate to music? Campbell offers Pascal Criton's operation – she "translates all of this into a musical context when she notes that 'musical writing' involves movement from the 'autonomization of signs', to the extent that force-form relations circulate from sounds to signs, from gestures to tools and to representations of time and space" (p. 146). Then Campbell draws a connection to Deleuzean molecularity: "These forces meet and enter into relations at a molecular level, below that of representational forms and in such a way that they formulate an intensive diagram composed of music's most molecular properties and components. These range from the relatively molar character of individual chords, pitch aggregates, musical gestures, single pitches, durations, timbres and attacks to the previously unattainable sub-components of sound and pitch, all of which can be connected, disconnected and transposed in multiple ways as a new diagram is traced with its functions reorganized" (pp. 146–147). Essentially, we can say that sound is a "heterogeneous reality", a "multiplicity made up of contingencies and determinations (...) which decrease and increase accord to the event that is in process. Again, this can be compared (or backed up, supported, assembled) with Jean-Luc Nancy's attempt to establish multiplicity of origins of arts, that is, to show how different art produces different realities. Each cut in spatio-temporal articulations in music, however, also point out non-musical sources of becoming, the *other*.

Finally, to wrap the discussion and curve it back to where it started, Lachenmann's theory behind his compositions is close to Deleuze & Guattari's observations regarding philosophy.



Lachenmann's *tonality* merges with their understanding of *opinion*, "by which they mean everything that is safely accepted and which seemingly protects us from chaos, is the enemy of art, and that it is art's function to oppose opinion and to pierce the fabric of chaos in order to cast a plane over it" (p. 153). This is where the subtle elitism charges through the backdoor and again attempts to reduce music to problem-solving *perpetuum mobile*, as they attack "the imitators" and proclaim: "Since there will always be imitators who wish to restore the clichés of opinion and to expel the previously 'incommunicable novelty' that has been rested from chaos, there is a continual need for new creators 'to carry out necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions.'" Campbell will finalize this by defining (quoting) Deleuze-Guattarian *opinion* and Lachenmann's *tonality* as "systems of domination and repression" which prohibit creativity and stimulate the engendering of empty and repetitive messages (ibid.). Granted, believing to be an excavator of musical sense makes one akin to disliking emotional (that is, existential) world intrinsic to art, and the fullness of musical easily slips their mind. It is important to keep in mind that there is more to music than object-oriented problem solving (which is, in a sense, fictionalized), even though one might prefer one over the other. It is also important to spot how easily they detect the global stream of simplification tendencies within the world of music *production*, rather than *composing*, and that really does bear a flag of repetition that provokes mental numbness. With these thoughts being written, I conclude that Campbell's work *Music after Deleuze* is worth reading, and, in a more important sense, worth of being included into further research.

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## Heinrich C. Kuhn

### Philosophie der Renaissance

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Das Buch *Philosophie der Renaissance; Grundkurs Philosophie Band 8/1* von Heinrich C. Kuhn, der an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in München tätig ist, gehört

einer der Geschichte der Philosophie gewidmeten Lehrbuchreihe *Grundkurs Philosophie*, die als Urban-Taschenbücher im Verlag W. Kohlhammer erscheinen. Bis heute sind die folgenden Bände erschienen: Band 6: *Antike*; Band 7: *Mittelalter*; Band 8/2: *Philosophie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*; Band 8: *Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts*; Band 10: *Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts*.

Im Unterschied zu den anderen Bänden der Reihe, hat sich Kuhn für eine originelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem besonderen Teil der Geschichte der Philosophie entschlossen. Dabei würde man erwarten, dass er eine neue Zeitspanne der Philosophie der Renaissance vorschläge, oder ein anderes von den üblichen *klassischen* philosophischen Problemen der Renaissance berührt, aber das ist nicht der Fall (wie er selbst in dem für diese Reihe außerordentlich langen Vorwort erklärt, ist das klassische Problem der Zeitspanne der Renaissance für ihn kein Problem, da Cusanus und Suarez im vorigen Band, und Descartes und Bacon im folgenden Band schon eingeschlossen sind). Das Neue an diesem Band ist, nicht so viel im Bereich des Inhalts sondern im Bereich des Zugangs: statt die Philosophie der Renaissance in einer schon üblichen Art und Weise als ein Zusammenstoß der verschiedenen philosophischen Systeme und dazu gehörenden Menschen zu betrachten, hat sich Kuhn für die Fallstudienmethode entschieden. Also, anstatt der Analyse von bestimmten Strömungen oder Menschen der Renaissance, konzentriert sich Kuhn auf die besonderen Momente und die definierenden Kontext dieser Momente. Daher sind also auch die Titel der Kapitel nicht etwa „Der Platonismus/die Platonismen der Renaissance“ oder „Pico della Mirandola“ sondern: „Prag 1356“, „Padua 1408“, „Florenz 1434“, „Wien 1489“, „Florenz 1519“, „Wittenberg 1560“, „Ingolstadt 1577“, „Montaigne 1588“, „Ciudad de Mexico 1599“, „Peking 1601“ und „Paris 1625/München 2013“ (dabei auch das Vorwort unter dem Titel „Vorwort – München 2013“ gibt dem Buch eine persönliche Note). Jedes einzelne Kapitel kann sich als eine selbstständige Abhandlung lesen: dazu befindet sich die Bibliographie der im Kapitel verwendeten Literatur am Ende des jeweiligen Kapitels.

Die allgemeine Strategie dieses Buches ist den Text eines Autors innerhalb einer Tradition, zu der dieser Autor gehörte, zu betrachten und kurz zu analysieren. Kuhn selbst schreibt darüber klar: „Ich behandle den Text hier nicht um seiner selbst willen, sondern aus dem Bewusstsein heraus, dass ideengeschichtliche bzw. philosophiehistorische

Texte [...] die Erkenntnis wirkmächtiger Traditionen, in denen sie (gleich ob zustimmend oder widersprechend) stehen, anerkennen sollen“ (S. 62).

Da jedes Kapitel des Buches von Kuhn sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Philosophie der Renaissance befasst, wäre es für diese Übersicht nicht geeignet, alle Themen von Kuhn zu isolieren und analysieren. Stattdessen werde ich nur einige beispielhafte Momente des Buches auswählen und an ihnen die besonderen Stärken sowie Schwächen des Buches zeigen.

Im Jahre 1356 lebte Francesco Petrarca nur ein paar Monate am Kaiser Karl IV. Hoff in Prag, wo die *Universitas Carolina* als *studium generale* schon gegründet war. Karl IV. und Petrarca hatten einen reichen Briefwechsel, der bis zur Mitte der 1360er dauerte. In der Zeit des intensiven Briefwechsels arbeitet Petrarca an seinem zweiteiligen Werk *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. Kuhn fokussiert sich besonders auf den 96. Dialog des ersten Teils „Von König- und Kaisertum“, weil sich dieser Dialog an den Briefwechsel bezieht. In diesem Kapitel versucht Kuhn dem Begriff des Humanismus nahe zu kommen und ihn in seinem ursprünglichen Kontext darzustellen. Die Neuheit der Kuhn'schen Näherung dem Begriffe des Humanismus besteht darin, dass er nicht von den Vorurteilen der Voraussetzung dieses viel geprägten und oft unklar benutzen Begriffes des Humanismus anfängt und die Ereignisse und Menschen von dieser Hinsicht betrachtet, sondern eben versucht, ihn durch die Analyse der primären Texte und historischen Fakten zu erklären. Daher wird klar, warum Kuhn auf die Erwähnung dieses Markenzeichens der Renaissance durchaus im ganzen Buch verzichtet.

Im Jahre 1434 verfasste Leon Battista Alberti sein Werk *De familia* und die Florenz ist die Stadt auf die sich sein Werk bezieht. Im zweiten und dritten Buch bearbeitet Alberti unter anderen auch die Lage der Frauen in der Renaissance-Gesellschaft. Seiner Meinung nach haben Frauen eine scheue Natur, sie sind langsam und weich, und sollten Männern dienen. Obwohl es in der Renaissance auch gebildete Frauen gab, die sich auch mit Philosophie befassten, war diese Zeit keine gute Zeit für Philosophinnen, meint Kuhn. Damit stellt er sich im Gegensatz zu Burkhardts weit verbreiteter und oft unkritisch angenommener These, dass die Renaissance eigentlich eine betont frauenfreundliche Periode war.

Im Jahre 1489 war Wien die Residenzstadt des Königs Matthias Corvinus, der eine große Bibliothek besaß. Er zeigte besondere Interessen für Magie und Astrologie. So hatte er in

seiner Bibliothek auch *De vita libri tres* von Marsilio Ficino. Der dritte Teil dieses großen Buches unter dem Titel „De vita coelitus comparanda“ hat Ficino im Jahre 1489 Corvinus gewidmet. In diesem Kapitel befasst sich Kuhn mit Ficinios Verständnis von Magie (aber nicht, zu meiner Enttäuschung, mit Ficinios Verständnis von Astrologie und Hermetismus) und kommt zum folgenden Schluss: „Nicht nur, und nicht primär, eine Koppelung von Magie und Astrologie war es, die in der Wirkungsgeschichte von Ficinios *De vita coelitus comparanda* gewirkt hat, sondern primär die Naturmagie allgemein und die Theorie ihrer kosmologischen Grundlagen“ (S. 98).

Im Jahre 1577 wurde an der 1472 gegründeten Universität in Ingolstadt Jesuit Antonius Balduinus *Decanus pro tempore* der philosophischen Fakultät ernannt. Obwohl sein Aufenthalt in Ingolstadt kurz war, hatte er in dieser Zeit zwei Werke bereitet: das Erste ist die der Naturphilosophie gewidmete Disputation und das Zweite ist die der Metaphysik gewidmete Disputation. Ohne in den Kern von Disputationen einzugehen, ist evident „[...] dass zumindest soweit es um Balduinus geht, weder zu befürchten ist, dass Philosophie bei Dominanz jesuitischer Dozenten nur noch im Blick auf Theologie getrieben werde, noch dass zu befürchten wäre, Philosophie würde nur noch gemäß der *communis opinio*, als Mainstream-Philosophie geboten“ (S. 163).

Am Ende des Buches behandelt Kuhn zwei Städte, die in genereller Literatur über die Philosophie der Renaissance normalerweise nicht auftauchen: Ciudad de Mexico und Peking.

Im Jahre 1599 hat Jesuit Antonius Rubius Ciudad de Mexico verlassen, um seine Werke in Europa zu veröffentlichen. In Mexico hat er folgende philosophischen Werke geschrieben: Schriften zur Logik und Kommentare zu des Aristoteles *Physica*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *De caelo*, *De anima*. Im Mittelpunkt dieses Kapitel stehen Rubius Texte zur Logik, die in drei Versionen erscheinen: 1. im 1603 in Alcalá gedruckte Version; 2. im 1606 in Valencia gedruckte Version und 3. im 1610 in Alcalá gedruckte Version. Rubius Logik war für eine Zeit lang Standardliteratur, auf die sich auch spätere Werke zur Logik bezogen haben.

Jesuit Matteo Ricci hat sich im Jahre 1601 dauerhaft in Peking angesiedelt. Seine Reise fing im Jahre 1577 an, als er für eine Indienmission ausgewählt wurde. Ricci, der schnell die chinesische Sprache gut genug gelernt hat, ist wegen seiner chinesischen Weltkarten bekannt geworden. Im Jahre 1596 hat er sein erstes chinesisches Buch *Jiaoyou lun* (*Über*

*Freundschaft*) geschrieben. Danach folgten *Tianzhu shiyi* (*Die wahre Bedeutung des Herrn des Himmels*), *Ershiwu yan* (*Fünfundzwanzig Sentenzen*), und *Jiren shipian* (*Zehn Abhandlungen des paradoxalen Mannes*). Matteo Ricci starb in China im Jahre 1610.

Das letzte Kapitel, „Paris 1625/München 2013“ endet mit einem Abschnitt mit dem ich völlig einverstanden bin „[p]hilosophische Texte der Renaissance ‚wiederzubeleben‘, erneut zum Teilen einer lebendigen Tradition von Bezugspunkten zeitgenössischer philosophischer Diskussionen zu machen, scheint mir weder möglich noch sinnvoll. Nützlicher sein können sie in philosophiehistorischer Betrachtung: als Belege für und Anlass zur Einsicht in die Kontextgebundenheit und zugleich Freiheit menschlichen Denkens, im besten Fall gar Einsicht in die Kontextgebundenheit und zugleich Freiheit unseres jeweils eigenen Denkens“ (S. 223–224).

Es ist ein mutiges Unterfangen die Geschichte der Philosophie der Renaissance neu zu schreiben. Nur das an sich verdient Lob. Die Vielfalt und Komplexität dieser Epoche macht es besonders schwierig eine Auswahl der Texte zu machen, die alle Leser und ihre Interessen befriedigen würde. Das Buch *Philosophie der Renaissance* ist ein origineller Versuch die Philosophie der Renaissance anders zu präsentieren. Obwohl es in diesem Versuch auch Nachteile gibt, ist dieses Buch eine erfolgreiche und erfrischende Auseinandersetzung mit der Philosophie der Renaissance, die nicht nur einen neuen Zugang zur Philosophie der Renaissance bietet, sondern auch einen frischen Duft des milden, gegen die sakrosankten immer wieder zitierten Autoritäten der Sekundärliteratur gerichteten Ikonoklasmas mit sich bringt.

**Ivana Skuhala Karasman**

We apologise to our readers for republishing by mistake the book review by Igor Eterović, “Matthew C. Altman: *Kant and Applied Ethics. The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*” in the previous issue of *Synthesis philosophica* 57 (1/2014). The book review was originally published in the issue 54 (2/2012), pp. 383–385.